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Less Trust Means More Trusts 
Bridget J. Crawford* 
Abstract 
The word “trust” has multiple meanings. In everyday speech, it 
refers to a feeling of confidence associated with integrity, such as 
trusting that a friend will keep a secret. In the financial context, 
some law students, lawyers and lucky individuals also understand 
that a trust is a near-magical device that splits legal and equitable 
title. A trustee holds formal legal title to property for the benefit of 
a beneficiary simply because the grantor declares it to be so. By 
turning the spotlight on “trust,” in both senses of the word, one can 
discern fault lines in contemporary U.S. political and legal 
structures. These are made even plainer when examined through 
the lens of ongoing litigation involving human embryos created by 
actress Sofia Vergara and her former fiancé.  
Just as termites can enter homes through foundational cracks 
or wood brought from the outside, interpersonal, community or 
structural confidence may erode in the face of hostility, indifference 
or inequality. Similarly, as termites can slowly damage a home over 
a period of years before the harm becomes visible, the beneficial 
form of ownership known as a trust gradually–and then suddenly–
has morphed almost beyond recognition over the last twenty-five 
years. Eaten away are the traditional limitations on trust duration, 
trust modification and the type of property that can be held in trust. 
In some states, irrevocable trusts can last forever, be decanted to 
another trust with entirely different terms, or even hold legal “title” 
to human embryos. These changes to centuries of trust law reveal 
changing attitudes about wealth, property ownership, and personal 
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autonomy. If society truly values equal opportunity for all people, 
then trust–and trusts–need attention.  
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I. Introduction  
The word “trust” has multiple meanings. In everyday speech, 
it refers to a feeling of confidence associated with integrity, such 
as trusting that a friend will keep a secret.1 When passengers 
board an airplane, they trust that the pilot is qualified and 
competent.2 Trust also is the fragile and vulnerable precondition 
for democracy’s existence.3 Just as wood girds a house, trust girds 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Linda Tripp Deserves to Be Prosecuted, NEWSDAY, 
Aug. 25, 1999, at A39 (detailing Monica Lewinsky’s misplaced trust in her “friend” 
Linda Tripp who, at the behest of law enforcement, recorded conversations about 
Lewinsky’s relationship with President Clinton).  
 2. Bill Murphy, Jr., American Airlines Flight Was Canceled for a Truly 
Insane Reason (Hint: It's the Last Thing Any Passenger Ever Wants to Hear About 
the Pilot), INC. (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.inc.com/bill-murphy-jr/an-american-
airlines-flight-was-just-canceled-for-a-truly-insane-reason-hint-its-last-thing-
any-passenger-ever-wants-to-hear-about-pilot.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) 
(reporting on the removal of an American Airlines pilot in Manchester, England 
on the suspicion of being intoxicated) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 3. See, e.g., Mark Warren, Trust and Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
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a society. Thomas Jefferson knew it.4 Alexander Hamilton knew 
it.5 Both men understood trust as foundational to government, 
although they had different views on who could be trusted to lead.6 
Both would have agreed that trust must flow at a minimal rate 
from the government to the people and from the people back to the 
government, as well as among the people. Otherwise, We the People 
lose confidence in the political and legal structures that are 
fundamental to society.7 
Although the comparison may surprise at first, trust—in the 
plain-meaning sense and in a political sense—connects deeply to 
the legal device known as a trust. Law students, lawyers and lucky 
individuals understand that a trust is a near-magical device, 
splitting legal and equitable title between a trustee and a 
beneficiary.8 A trustee holds formal legal title to property for the 
                                                                                                     
OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRUST 75 (Eric M. Uslander ed., 2018) (“Democracy and 
trust have an essential but paradoxical relationship to one another. . . . Trust in 
governments enables citizens to provide collectively conditions for good lives. Yet 
the institutions of democracy were founded on distrust, especially of the 
powerful.”). 
 4. Thomas Jefferson identified two groups in the early nation: “[T]hose who 
fear and distrust the people . . . [and] those who identify themselves with the 
people, have confidence in them, cherish and consider them as the most honest 
and safe . . . .” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, 10 August 1824, 
FOUNDERS EARLY ACCESS, 
https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-print-04-
02-02-4451 (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 5. Alexander Hamilton imagined a sort of ruling class with greater 
authority and rights to participate in a democratic government. Hamilton said 
that communities naturally divided into “the few” and “the many.” 1 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 299 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) 
(statement of Alexander Hamilton at Constitutional Convention). Hamilton 
believed that the “few” (whom he called “rich and well-born”) would effectively 
check any improper impulses of the masses. Id.  
 6. See generally JOHN FERLING, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE RIVALRY 
THAT FORGED A NATION xv (2013) (“Politics in the broadest framework is likely to 
witness continuing divisions over the competing ideas that set Jefferson and 
Hamilton at odds.”). 
 7. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANEIL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 
77 (2018) (“The erosion of democracy takes place piecemeal, often in baby steps. 
Each individual step seems minor—none appears to truly threaten democracy. 
Indeed, government moves to subvert democracy frequently enjoy a veneer of 
legality.”).   
 8. See, e.g., Scott Andrew Shepard, A Uniform Perpetuities Reform Act, 16 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.  POL’Y 89, 116–17 (2013) (describing the trust’s split of 
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benefit of a beneficiary, simply because the grantor declares it to 
be so.9 The extent to which a society does (or does not) tolerate 
trusts is a measure of the health of that society’s political and legal 
structures, to a certain extent. 
Part II of this Essay employs the metaphor of termites eating 
away at a building to explain how the erosion of trust can damage 
any relationship, community or society. Part III argues that a lack 
of trust in the legal system gave rise to the legal device for 
preserving or transferring assets known as the trust. Trust law has 
been relatively stable for centuries, but over the last twenty-five 
years, major changes to trust law have transformed these 
tradition-bound vehicles almost beyond recognition. Yet still trusts 
flourish because of a lack of trust. Part IV explores the function of 
trusts in contemporary U.S. society, given that certain types of 
trusts perpetuate wealth inequality. Although trusts that keep 
rich people rich are the subject of the greatest criticism, Part V of 
this Essay argues that Louisiana’s unusual trust law—which 
permits human embryos to be held in trust and to have legal 
standing—presents a greater challenge to the legal system. The 
effect of the Louisiana law is to push good-faith debate out of 
venues in which ordinary citizens can participate into the esoteric 
world of “money law” specialists instead.10 
II. The Nature of Termites and Trust(s) 
Termites can enter buildings from the outside.11 They make 
tunnels through the ground, up the concrete foundation and into 
the wood of the structure.12 Termites might also enter homes 
                                                                                                     
legal and equitable title between the trustee and the beneficiaries).  
 9. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §  27 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) 
(requiring trust to be administered for benefit of beneficiaries).   
 10. This is Alice Abreu’s wonderful phrase. See Alice G. Abreu, Tax Counts: 
Bringing Money-Law to LatCrit, 78 DENV. U.L. REV. 575, 575 n.1 (2001) (“By 
‘money-law,’ I mean the areas traditionally viewed as comprising the business 
curriculum: tax, corporations, securities, commercial law (UCC), securities, 
banking, antitrust and the like.”). 
 11. JOHN TYLER BONNER, CELLS AND SOCIETIES 76 (1955) (describing 
pathways by which termites may enter a structure from the outside). 
 12. Theodore A. Evans et al., Termites Eavesdrop to Avoid Competitors, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, Nov. 22 2009, at 
4035, 4035–36 (describing difference between subterranean termites, 
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through wood brought from the outside.13 Thus termites from the 
outside essentially can “attack” a property that previously was 
termite-free.14 Alternately, a structure might be infested with 
termites from the day it is built, if the wood used in its construction 
already contains the insects.15  
Termites can lurk in wood for many years and years before 
their damage becomes visible.16 After making hundreds, 
thousands, and millions of little bites—bites imperceptible when 
made one by one—just a few of these tiny creatures can destroy an 
entire building.17 As a thought experiment, consider the 
capabilities of one termite. A single insect would need over 3,000 
years to eat all of the wood in a home of 1,000 square feet in size 
(the average termite’s lifespan is only two years).18 But because 
termites live in colonies of millions, and multiple colonies may be 
found in the same structure, destruction can occur rapidly. By the 
time the property owner sees physical evidence of termite damage, 
the structure already may be beyond repair.19   
Using termites as a metaphor, one can gauge the level of trust 
in any community.  Trust within any group of any size—no less 
between and among the people and political and legal leaders—can 
erode bite by bite from termites on the inside.  It happens in 
workplaces, where colleagues pass each other in the hallway and 
do not say hello or make eye contact because of some perceived 
wrongdoing, whether years in the past or yesterday. That type of 
behavior is uncivil and eats away at the workplace culture, just as 
termites eat away at wood. Similarly, trust can erode in families 
and in personal relationships by forgetting to thank someone for 
                                                                                                     
Coptotermes, and drywood termites, Cryptotermes).  
 13. Id. at 436 (explaining behavior of Cyprtotermes). 
 14. Supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., C. A. Kofoid, The Fight Against Termites, 3 SCI. MONTHLY 275, 
275 (1935) (noting that lumber in homes provides termites with even more 
desirable food than wood that has naturally died).  
 16. See, e.g., Comparing Methods for Termite Treatment, DAILY HERALD, Nov. 
23, 2018, at 2 (observing that termites “can go unnoticed for years”). 
 17. See, e.g., How Fast Do Termites Eat Wood? TERMINIX (Mar. 5, 2015), 
https://www.terminix.com/termite-control/termite-facts (last visited Mar. 30, 
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 18. Id. (estimating time that one termite would need to eat small house). 
 19. Id. 
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doing an errand,20 or failing to say, “I’m sorry,”21 when an apology 
is appropriate.22 Trust erodes in a social group, when one remains 
silent in the face of remarks that discriminate against some 
members.23 Just as any one termite bite does not cause much 
damage to a building, any one incident of incivility, hostility, lack 
of gratitude, or dishonesty will not cause a community to become 
toxic or make political or legal systems unstable, to be sure. But 
through accumulated termite bites, the insects will destroy an 
entire structure, fracture a workplace, family, community, or 
political and legal systems.24 
III.  Trust and Trusts 
A. The Origins of Trusts 
One need not be a legal historian to understand that trusts 
were invented to do an end-run around the law.25 A quick glance 
at one popular law school Trusts & Estates casebook reveals that 
from inception, the use—the precursor to the trust—was 
established for the sole purpose of getting around certain rules.26 
                                                                                                     
 20. See, e.g., Lisa A. Williams & Monica Y. Bartlett, Warm Thanks: 
Gratitude Expression Facilitates Social Affiliation in New Relationships Via 
Perceived Warmth, 15 EMOTION 1 (2015) (demonstrating empirical relationship 
between expressions of gratitude and positive perception by others). 
 21. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1009, 1010 (1999) (“Parents, or at least good parents, teach children to take 
responsibility when they have wronged another: Apologize and make amends. In 
contrast, lawyers typically counsel the opposite.”). 
 22.  See, e.g., Kenneth Cloke, Designing Heart-Based Systems to Encourage 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Divorcing Families, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 418, 424 
(2015) (“Forgiveness is not something you do for someone else . . . .”). 
 23.  Beverly Tatum, Breaking the Silence, in WHITE PRIVILEGE: ESSENTIAL 
READINGS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF RACISM 147, 147 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 3d ed. 
2008) (advocating for more explicit discussion about race in order to minimize 
racially-motivated violence). 
 24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing structural damage 
effectuated by many termites over comparatively shorter period of time).  
 25. See GEORGE C. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS 6, n.14 (5th ed. 1973) (attributing the origins of the trust to the 
fideicommissum of ancient Rome).  
 26. See, e.g., ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS & 
ESTATES 386 (10th ed. 2017) (“Because the friars were forbidden to own property, 
benefactors conveyed land to friends of the friars, to hold to the use of the friars.”).  
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Specifically, in the thirteenth century in England, the Franciscan 
order prevented its mendicant friars from owning any property.27 
But because the monks needed stable places to live and worship, 
the Franciscans occasionally identified a wealthy patron who 
would convey land to a third party to hold the property for the 
benefit of the friars, who could then use it for their own purposes.28 
Once the use became widely known, wealthy people began 
employing it to avoid feudal incidents, or a type of tax obligation.29 
Thus, it is fair to say that the history of trusts always—or for at 
least a very long time—has been intertwined with some type of 
avoidance.30 Trusts are legal instruments that meet the needs of 
those who proclaim, “I don’t like or trust the system, so let’s figure 
a way around the rules.”   
B.  Contemporary Trusts 
Fast-forward about 900 years—with apologies to the actual 
legal historians—and trusts are alive and well in the twenty-first 
century. Trusts in this country hold trillions of dollars worth of 
assets.31 At the most basic level, trusts allow rich people to stay 
rich, because if money is held in a perpetual trust, it need not ever 
vest in any beneficiary.32 Absent vesting (and inclusion in 
someone’s taxable estate), there will never be an additional tax—
                                                                                                     
 27. See, e.g., F. W. Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HARV. L. REV. 127, 130 
(1894).  
 28. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 26, at 386 (explaining arrangement 
among feoffor to uses [analogous to the donor] for the benefit of the cestui que use, 
the friars [analogous to a beneficiary]). 
 29. Id. at 387. 
 30. But see Grayson M. P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against 
Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1291 (2013) (tracing explosion in use of long-term 
trusts to the 1986 enactment of the generation-skipping transfer tax).  
 31. See, e.g., John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion 
Wealth Transfer Estimate Is Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Questions, 7 
J. GIFT PLAN. 11 (Jan. 2003) (evaluating prediction that for years 1998 through 
2052, wealthy individuals will transfer up to $41 trillion by way of private express 
trusts). 
 32. See, e.g., Phyllis C. Smith, The Estate and Gift Tax Implications of Self-
Settled Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Can You Really Have Your Cake and 
Eat It Too? 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 25, 50–57 (2009) (explaining role of estate tax 
inclusion of trust assets in wealth transfer tax system). 
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beyond the tax on the initial transfer in trust—imposed on the 
movement of wealth from one generation to or for the benefit of 
another.33  
To be sure, there is a category of trusts that has nothing to do 
with tax avoidance or doing an “end-run” around that law.34 Those 
are trusts for beneficiaries who do not have sufficient capacity to 
own or manage property themselves.35 That may be by virtue of 
being too young—they simply are not old enough to own property36 
—or the beneficiary may be suffering from some sort of 
neurological difference that makes that person unable to manage 
assets.37 These trusts are functional, desirable, efficient 
alternatives to expensive court-appointed guardianships or 
custodianships.38 They allow families to ensure a minimal level of 
financial resources for loved ones.39 This Essay brackets those 
trusts out of the discussion entirely.  
In the case of trusts that are designed to keep rich people rich, 
three very curious things have happened in the United States in 
the last twenty-five years. These have revolutionized trust law 
more than anything else in the last 400 years: the rise of self-
                                                                                                     
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Kristen M. Lewis, Planning Challenges for Beneficiaries with 
Special Needs, 46 EST. PLAN. 14 (2019) (detailing reasons for transfers of assets 
in trust for the benefit of a physically or mentally disabled individual). 
 35.   See, e.g., John M. Hemenway, Effective Estate Planning for the Modern 
Family in Uncertain Times, ASPATORE 2013 WL 9711 at *6–7 (describing minors’ 
legal inability to own property outright and use of minority trusts in certain non-
taxable estates).  
 36. These so-called “minority trusts” typically provide for property to be held 
in trust until the beneficiary attains the age of twenty-one (21) years. See, e.g., 
James S. Sligar & Bridget J. Crawford, Form 6, in DAVID WESTPHALL & GEORGE 
MAIR, ESTATE PLANNING LAW AND TAXATION A-42 (4th ed. 2003) (providing for 
entrustment of any property passing to a beneficiary under the age of 21). 
 37. See, e.g., Chadwick Allen Harp, Estate Planning for the Disabled 
Beneficiary, 11 APR. PROB. & PROP. 14, 14–15 (1997) (describing use of trusts for 
disabled beneficiaries and desirability of maintaining beneficiary’s eligibility for 
governmental benefits). 
 38.  See, e.g., Allen D. Webster & Douglas K. Riley, Estate Planning for the 
Family with a Disabled Child, 14 VT. L. REV. 529, 540 (1990) (describing time, 
cost and restrictions associated with a court-appointed guardian for a minor or 
disabled beneficiary). 
 39. See, e.g., Stephanie R. Hoffer, Making the Law More ABLE: Reforming 
Medicaid for Disability, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1255 (2015) (describing obstacles faced 
by disabled individuals seeking to become eligible for certain federal benefits).  
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settled asset protection trusts,40 the proliferation of trust 
decanting rules41 and the repeal of the rule against perpetuities42 
in over half of the jurisdictions in the nation.43 Each of these 
changes is, has been, and will continue to be the subject of study 
and scrutiny.44  
In order to focus the discussion of trust and trusts, consider the 
rule against perpetuities. Law professors, law students, and 
lawyers learn to hate the rule because it is befuddling, confusing, 
and a minefield for professional errors.45 Depending on the 
jurisdiction where they find themselves, some members of the 
same population then may herald the rule’s repeal, rejoicing that 
they no longer have to teach it, learn it, or risk making a costly 
professional mistake.46  
                                                                                                     
 40. See generally RICHARD W. NENNO & JOHN E. SULLIVAN III, 868 T.M. 
DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS at I.C. (defining an asset protection trust as 
one created by the settlor “in which the settlor may retain some potential benefits 
that cannot be reached by creditors” of the settlor). Prior to 1997, asset protection 
trusts were not able to be created in any U.S. jurisdiction, but now are permitted 
by Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Id.  
 41. See generally WILLIAM R. CULP, JR. & BRIANI BENNETT MELLEN, TRUST 
DECANTING, 871 T.M. TRUST DECANTING at I.A. (explaining decanting as “the 
distribution of trust property from one trust to another pursuant to a trustee's 
discretionary power to make distributions to or for the benefit of one or more 
beneficiaries”).  
 42. The rule against perpetuities is the rule “prohibiting a grant of an estate 
unless the interest must vest, if at all, no later than 21 years . . . after the death 
of some person alive when the interest was created.” Rule Against Perpetuities, 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 43. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER P. CLINE, T.M. 838 DYNASTY TRUSTS 2d ed. at II.C. 
(classifying states into groups according to their rules against perpetuities).  
 44. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to 
the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000) (calling repeal of rule against 
perpetuities a “race to the bottom”). 
 45. Professor Barton Leach famously commented that the rule against 
perpetuities was “so abstruse that it is misunderstood by a substantial percentage 
of those who advise the public . . . [and] so capricious that it strikes down in the 
name of public order gifts which offer no offense except that they are couched in 
the wrong words.” W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's 
Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721, 722 (1952).  
 46. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or 
The RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 656 (2000) 
(asserting that the rule against perpetuities “is hard to learn, and students are 
customers now. Why risk bad evaluations when teaching sexy topics is so easy?”); 
Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal for a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against 
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In 1997, the Alaska legislature passed a law that provided, in 
essence, that trusts could last forever.47 Jonathan Blattmachr, 
then a partner at Milbank LLP,48 was one of the principal drafters 
of the perpetuities repeal legislation in Alaska.49 Blattmachr’s 
motivation to work on repeal legislation stemmed from a growing 
awareness that his clients were establishing trusts in foreign 
jurisdictions to take advantage of laws that permitted self-settled 
asset protection trusts and perpetual trusts.50 He thought that a 
domestic venue would be more reliable; he focused on Alaska 
because of the relatively small and cohesive bar in that state and 
because it was less tradition-bound than his home state of New 
York.51 Alaska Governor Tony Knowles signed the bill into law on 
April 1, 1997.52  
After the passage of the Alaska legislation, jurisdictions like 
Delaware, South Dakota and a variety of other states modernized 
or radically altered their trust laws.53 Now, in over half of the 
jurisdictions in the U.S., an individual can create a trust that lasts 
forever (or at least for the lifetimes of many more successive 
generations than any common law perpetuities period would 
permit).54  
                                                                                                     
Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REV. 545, 545 (1988) (lamenting the rule against 
perpetuities as “one of the most difficult areas of our law”). 
 47. See Alaska Trust Act, H.B. 101, 20th Leg. Sess. (1997); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 34.27.050(a) (allowing abolition of the rule in trusts where the trustee had 
discretion to distribute some or all of the trust income and/or principal to a person 
alive at the time of the trust’s creation). But see SLA 2000 ch. 17 §  9, eff. Apr. 22, 
2000 (repealing Alaska Stat. § 34.27.050(a) and replacing it with Alaska Stat. 
§ 34.27.051 that permits a 1,000 year period in gross for the exercise or non-
exercise of a general power of appointment not presently exercisable because of a 
condition precedent) and Alaska Stat. § 34.27.100 (retaining limit on suspension 
of power of alienation to 30 years).  
 48. For a general history of the firm, see ELLEN JOAN POLLACK, TURKS AND 
BRAHMINS: UPHEAVAL AT MILBANK, TWEED: WALL STREET’S GENTLEMEN TAKE OFF 
THEIR GLOVES (1990). 
 49. Bridget J. Crawford, On Perpetuities, Paradigms, and a Creative Life in 
the Law, TAX NOTES 289, 289–90 (2016) (interview with Jonathan G. Blattmachr). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 290 (describing obstacles to enactment in New York State).  
 52. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Veit, Note, Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts and the 
Alaska Trust Act: Has Alaska Moved Offshore? 16 ALASKA L. REV. 269 (1999) 
(providing overview of the Alaska Trust Act, including its legislative history). 
 53. See Sterk, supra note 44, at 1051–55.  
 54. See, e.g., NENNO & SULLLIVAN, T.M. 867, supra note 40, Worksheet 4 State 
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C. Twenty-First Century Trust Law Critiques 
Critics of perpetual trusts offer a variety of objections, 
including that the law encourages all trustees to invest 
conservatively.55 Others claim that perpetual trusts create a 
monied aristocracy that is inconsistent with notions of equal 
opportunity.56 Still others frame their opposition in terms of 
intergenerational equity, saying that each major age cohort should 
be able to decide for itself whether and how to dispose of trust 
property.57 And others point to the lost tax revenue from perpetual 
trusts.58 Simply stated, in the case of a trust that lasts forever, if 
the trust assets never vest in a beneficiary’s estate, the assets will 
not be subject to wealth transfer taxation when they become 
available to the next generation.59   
Focusing on the law’s tolerance of perpetual trusts, it is 
reasonable to ask who “wins” and who “loses.” At the most basic 
level, the government loses, in the sense that it is unable to collect 
wealth transfer tax revenue if a trust never terminates.60 Wealthy 
people win because they can stay or get wealthier if they do not 
pay taxes.61 Beyond the losses to the federal tax coffers and 
                                                                                                     
Perpetuities Statutes. 
 55. See Haskell, supra note 46, at 558–59 (arguing that trustees tend to 
invest conservatively). This argument has less purchase in light of the enactment 
of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act that allows the trustee to evaluate trust 
investments “in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of an 
overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited 
to the trust.” Uniform Prudent Investor Act §  2(b) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1994).  
 56. Ray Madoff, America Builds an Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010, 
at A19.  
 57. See, e.g., LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 58–59 
(1955). Yet anecdotal evidence suggests that many perpetual trusts grant each 
generation a limited power of appointment to dispose of trust property.  See 
Bridget J. Crawford, Who’s Afraid of Perpetual Trusts, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 79, 86–87 (2012). 
 58. See, e.g., Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail is Killing the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, 87 TAX NOTES 569, 570 (2000) (describing long-term trusts as 
mechanisms for avoiding generation-skipping transfer tax). 
 59. See, e.g., Jay A. Soled & Mitchell M. Gans, Asset Preservation and the 
Evolving Role of Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 72 WASH & LEE L. REV. 257, 
280–85 (2015) (explaining estate tax savings of completed lifetime gifts to long-
term or perpetual trusts). 
 60. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 61. For the period 1964 to 1994, wealth transfer taxes never represented 
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wealthy people staying rich (or becoming richer), consider, 
however, whether there might be other “losers” in this so-called 
low point in American trust jurisprudence.62 Or, to reframe the 
question: Why do the U.S. political and legal systems tolerate 
trusts? It seems clear that both trust and trusts are deeply 
implicated in the answer, but perhaps not in ways that traditional 
critics might think. 
IV.  Why Tolerate Trusts? 
A.  Trusts and Wealth Inequality 
Just as termites can slowly and steadily damage a home over 
a period of years before the harm suddenly becomes visible,63 the 
beneficial form of ownership known as a trust has gradually—and 
now suddenly—morphed nearly beyond recognition through the 
repeal of the rule against perpetuities, along with the other 
changes.64 Traditional trust limitations have been eaten away. 
Trusts—except ones for minors or disabled beneficiaries65—are all 
based in some sort of desire to work around some law, most often 
the tax law.66 Simply put, then, to the extent that trusts enable 
individuals to minimize or avoid taxation, then trusts certainly 
play some role in maintaining wealth inequality.67  
                                                                                                     
more than 2.33% of all federal tax revenue. See Christopher E. Erblich, Recent 
Development: To Bury Federal Transfer Taxes Without Further Adieu, 24 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1931, 1933 (1994). In 2017, the estate tax generated 0.7% of all 
revenue. Scott Eastman, New IRS Data Reiterates Shortcomings of the Estate Tax, 
TAX FOUND. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y2qqho7r (last visited Mar. 30, 
2019) (showing sharp decline in estate tax revenue since 2000) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Howard Gleckman, Only 1,700 Estates 
Would Owe Estate Tax in 2018 Under the TCJA, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://tinyurl.com/y3ozj94k (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) (estimating further 
decline in number of returns and gross estate tax owed in wake of Tax Cut and 
Jobs Act of 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62. See Sterk, supra note 44 (calling the contemporary trust law a “race to 
the bottom”). 
 63. See supra Part II. 
 64. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 65. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (excluding trusts for 
minors and disabled beneficiaries from discussion). 
 66. See infra Part III.A. 
 67. See generally Felix B. Chang, Assymetries in the Generation and 
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Wealth inequality in the U.S. is staggering.68 The gap between 
the rich and the poor is only getting larger.69 Trust lawyers should 
name and own their role in contributing to that inequality.70 
Consider, for example, data from the Congressional Budget Office 
for the period 1993 to 2013.71 During that time period, the richest 
10% of all families went from holding approximately 30% of all 
household wealth in this country to holding 76% of all family 
wealth.72 The poorest 50% of families did not gain or lose much.73 
Families in between the top 10% to top 15% gained about 9 
points.74 But the big “winners” during this period were families in 
                                                                                                     
Transmission of Wealth, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 93–98 (2018) (considering perpetual 
trusts in context of wealth redistribution concerns). But see Jonathan G. 
Blattmachr & Martin M. Shenkman, Trump Wins, A Brave New World for Estate 
Planners, ULTIMATE ESTATE PLANNER (Dec. 1, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y22trqhq 
(last updated Mar. 30, 2019) (“[S]tatistics as to the concentration of wealth in the 
U.S. suggest that the estate tax has not been particularly successful at dampening 
wealth concentration.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 68. See, e.g., THOMAS PICKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 304–
76 (2014) (documenting historic increase in wealth inequality, especially 
post-1980).  
 69. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the 
United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 37–38 
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20265, 2014), available at 
http:// www.nber.org/papers/w20625 (showing increase in wealth inequality over 
time). 
 70. See generally Thomas W. Mitchell, Growing Inequality and Racial 
Economic Gaps, 56 HOW. L.J. 849, 879–89 (2013) (discussing what the legal 
profession can do to promote economic inequality, including increasing minority 
homeownership and developing model laws that will promote equality). I include 
myself in this group, as I was a Trusts & Estates Associate at Milbank LLP from 
1996 to 2003. 
 71. Trends in Family Wealth, 1989 to 2013, Congressional Budget Office, 
CBO (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51846 (last visited Apr. 1, 
2019) (segmenting aggregate national wealth of $67 trillion by population, 
illustrating that the top 10 percent of all families held 76 percent of all wealth in 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 72. Measuring wealth concentration is hardly a settled matter. See, e.g, 
Wojciech Kopczuk, What Do We Know About the Evolution of Top Wealth Shares 
in the United States?, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2015, at 47, 53–57 (describing and 
identifying limitations of three different measures of wealth inequality). 
 73. Trends in Family Wealth, supra note 71 (bottom 50% of households 
declined in wealth from 1989 to 2013).  
 74. Id. (“The share of wealth held by families in the top 10 percent of the 
wealth distribution increased from 67 percent to 76 percent, whereas the share of 
wealth held by families in the bottom half of the distribution declined from 3 
percent to 1 percent.”). 
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the top 10%; they saw their share of wealth multiply two and one-
half times.75 
Wealth inequality must be understood not just in terms of 
individuals or families generically, but also with respect to race 
and other identifying characteristics.76 According to the Institute 
for Policy Studies, the 400 individuals who comprise the Forbes list 
of the richest people in America hold as much wealth as all African 
American households combined with one-third of all Latinx 
households.77 To better visualize this disparity, picture 400 
people—a group that might fill a medium-sized high school 
auditorium.78 It is possible to fill that auditorium with individuals 
in this country who have as much or more wealth than 
approximately 23 million people of color.79 
Wealth statistics also break down along other identity lines.80 
There are countless ways to analyze the data.81 The message is the 
same: Wealth in this country is concentrated in the hands of the 
few.82   
                                                                                                     
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Dedrick Asante-Muhammad et al., The Ever-Growing Gap, 
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Aug. 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y22ytyff (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2019) (comparing aggregate wealth of members of Forbes list with 
U.S. African-American and Latinx populations) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 77. Asante-Muhammad, supra note 76 at 6 (“America’s richest 400 
individuals—with a collective net worth of $2.34 trillion—now own more wealth 
than the entire Black population, plus one-third of the Latino population, 
combined.”).  
 78. See, e.g., Auditorium, Colville (WA) High School and About Colville High 
School, http://chs.colsd.org/auditorium (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) (showing size 
and layout of 400-person auditorium for a high school with a student enrollment 
of approximately 535) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 79. Asante-Muhammad, supra note 76 at 6. 
 80. See, e.g., Lucie Schmidt & Purvi Sevak, Gender, Marriage, and Asset 
Accumulation in the United States, 12 FEMINIST ECON. 139, 142–45  (2006) 
(showing single women are less wealthy than single men in United States).  
 81. See, e.g., Wealth Inequality in the United States, INEQUALITY.ORG, 
https://inequality.org/facts/wealth-inequality/#racial-wealth-divide (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2019) (showing that combined wealth of Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos and Warren 
Buffet is greater than all wealth held by bottom half of all Americans) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 82. See, e.g., Saez & Zucman, supra note 69 (showing historic trends in 
increasingly concentrated wealth in the U.S.).  
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B.  Trusts and the American Narrative 
Revenue may not be the most important “loss” from legal 
innovations that impede the taxation of transfers in trust.83 
Wealth transfer taxes represent a tiny percentage of all federal tax 
revenue.84 The greater loss related to perpetual trusts, to give just 
one example, is the expressive value of taxing wealth as it passes 
from generation to generation or accumulates over time.85 Because 
all of these referenced trust innovations are in their relative 
infancy, it is difficult to predict what the actual impact will be on 
wealthy individuals’ behavior.86 So any concern is better framed 
less about what the trusts actually do and more about what they 
symbolize. 
Trusts—and the seeming antidote to them, the estate tax—
both have expressive value.87 The estate tax has a transparent 
intent: redistribution of wealth.88 Trusts, especially perpetual 
trusts, are an easy target.89 Breaking up concentrations of wealth, 
                                                                                                     
 83.  See supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining how wealth 
transfer taxes represent a declining portion of already small percentage of federal 
tax revenue). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows et al., Foreword: We Are What We Tax, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2413, 2413–14 (2016) (discussing the expressive value of 
taxation). 
 86. But see Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional 
Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 
115 YALE L.J. 356, 410–11 (2005) (estimating that from 1997 through 2003, 
wealthy individuals transferred approximately $1 billion of assets to trusts in 
jurisdictions that had abolished the rule against perpetuities). 
 87. Trusts might, in fact, signal a lack of trust (and with good reason), in the 
case of a spendthrift beneficiary or one with a drug habit.  See, e.g., Christian 
Kelso, But What’s an Ascertainable Standard? Clarifying HEMS Distribution 
Standards and Other Fiduciary Considerations for Trustees, 10 EST. PLAN. & COM. 
PROP. L. J. 1, 58 (providing sample trust language prohibiting trustee from 
making distribution of any trust property if the beneficiary engages in illegal drug 
use).  
 88. Senator Elizabeth Warren, for example, has proposed an annual wealth 
tax of 2 to 3 percent. See Paul Krugman, Elizabeth Warren Does Teddy Roosevelt, 
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/opinion/elizabeth-warren-tax-
plan.html (last updated Jan. 28, 2019) (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 89. See, e.g., Paul Sullivan, The Ins and Outs of Trust That Last Forever, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/06/your-
money/estate-planning/the-ins-and-outs-of-perpetual-trusts.html (last updated 
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the seeming goal of the estate tax,90 is a natural extension of the 
notion, ideal, or even lesson communicated to children that the 
United States has or should have a democratic, egalitarian society 
in which there is one person, one vote, and equal opportunity for 
all.91 
More likely, however, the political and legal systems tolerate 
trusts because of a lesser explored part of that same meritocracy 
story. If anyone can be anything in the United States92—a place 
lacking a formal nobility,93 a country where an immigrant can go 
from rags to riches,94 and a land that fosters the creative spirit of 
a college drop-out who builds a multi-million dollar company in his 
garage95—then maybe anyone might become rich through hard 
work and effort. Just as a significant percentage of the population 
thinks the estate tax applies to them or their families96 (in fact, it 
                                                                                                     
Dec. 5, 2014) (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (“Critics of perpetual trusts have argued 
against them on moral grounds—saying tying up money for generations is bad 
public policy and could lead to a virtual aristocracy.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 90. See, e.g., Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX 
L. REV. 223, 235–36 (1956) (describing goal of wealth transfer tax as disrupting 
wealth concentration).  
 91. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-
address-president-barack-obama (last updated Jan. 21, 2013) (last visited Apr. 1, 
2019) (“We are true to our creed when a little girl born into the bleakest poverty 
knows that she has the same chance to succeed as anybody else, because she is 
an American; she is free, and she is equal, not just in the eyes of God but also in 
our own.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 92. See, e.g., CHARLES M. SCHULZ, YOU CAN BE ANYTHING! (2009) (collection of 
Peanuts cartoons showing Snoopy in a variety of professional and personal roles) 
 93. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art, I, §  9, cl. 8 (“[n]o Title of Nobility shall be 
granted by the United States”). 
 94. See, e.g., Andrea Navarro, Billionaire Immigrants Who Struck it Rich in 
the U.S., FORBES.COM, https://www.forbes.com/sites/andreanavarro/ 
2014/03/19/billionaire-immigrants-who-struck-it-rich-in-the-u-s/#2686f5b6764a 
(last updated Mar. 19, 2014) (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (profiling eight U.S. 
immigrants who are now billionaires) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 95. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. BECRAFT, BILL GATES: A BIOGRAPHY (2014) 
(describing the origins of Microsoft when Paul Allen and Bill Gates, who left 
Harvard College without graduating, began a company called “Micro-Soft” in an 
Albuquerque garage in 1975). 
 96. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: 
FIGHTING OVER INHERITED WEALTH 79–81 (2005) (describing how calling the 
estate tax a “death tax” causes non-wealthy Americans to become interested in—
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applies only to those with estates of more than $11.4 million, if 
single, or $22.8 million if married),97 a significant percentage of 
Americans likely think, “I might need a trust one day.” Thus, the 
legal (and practical) tolerance for trusts is entirely consistent with 
the American mythology that anyone can become anything, 
including rich and in need of a trust.  
Imagine a legal regime in which all of the changes to 
substantive trust law of the last twenty-five years—perpetual 
trusts, self-settled asset protection trust and trust decanting—
disappeared overnight.  It is possible to conceive of a system that 
allows trusts only for those who are unable to manage money for 
themselves, because of age or disability.98 Such changes unlikely 
would deter wealthy people from finding different ways to reduce 
their tax bills.99 If the government closes off one avenue for 
minimizing taxes, then smart, well-paid lawyers will find other 
ways to accomplish the same results.100 That cat-and-mouse game 
is built into the very structure of the U.S. tax system.101 
Most of the well-known changes to the U.S. trust law in the 
last twenty-five years do not represent a great threat to 
democracy.102 Citizens, lawyers and policy-makers who are 
committed to a fair and just society instead should turn their 
attention to a far lesser-known change to the law in the State of 
Louisiana. This change links more subtly and more profoundly to 
                                                                                                     
and object to—the tax). 
 97. See I.R.C. §  2010 (unified credit against estate tax that essentially 
“shelters” transfers of these amounts). 
 98. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.   
 99. Popular self-help books employ this language unabashedly. See, e.g., 
MARK TABAK, ANYONE CAN BE RICH! A PSYCHIATRIST PROVIDES THE MENTAL TOOLS 
TO BUILD YOUR WEALTH (2017). 
 100. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, The Loophole Artist, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/21/magazine/the-way-we-live-now-12-21-03-
encounter-the-loophole-artist.html?smid=pl-share (last updated Dec. 21, 2003) 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (noting that there are “thousands of lawyers and tax 
engineers who, with [any one particular] tax repealed, would put their minds to 
work helping the rich pay less”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 101. See, e.g., id. (“[The tax planner's] cat-and-mouse game is to work the 
loopholes in the system until the government finds them and draws them 
closed.”). 
 102. See infra Part III.B. 
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problems with contemporary political and legal structures in the 
U.S.   
V.  Human Embryos in Trust: The Case of Sofia Vergara 
Louisiana law treats as legal "persons" human embryos 
created through artificial reproductive technology.103 The statute 
provides that an “in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a 
juridical person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is 
implanted in the womb; or at any other time when rights attach to 
an unborn child in accordance with law.”104 As a juridical person, 
the fertilized ovum has the capacity to become a legal party to a 
lawsuit, for example.105 Louisiana law specifies that a fertilized 
human egg is not property, but rather “a biological human being,” 
and if the “donors of the sperm and ovum” choose to “express their 
identity,” then they have all of the rights that parents have under 
Louisiana law.106 The standard for adjudicating any disputes over 
the genetic material is the “best interest of the in vitro fertilized 
ovum.”107 
Curiously, even though Louisiana law defines human eggs 
fertilized in vitro as “not property,” Louisiana law appears to 
permit these embryos to be transferred to and held in a trust.108 
This treatment is not the result of an affirmative statement in the 
Louisiana trust law itself, but rather the statutory default rule 
that unless the governing instrument provides otherwise, a trustee 
may hold any type of property.109 In Louisiana, human embryos 
                                                                                                     
 103. Although several states have accorded “personhood” status to fetuses, 
Louisiana appears to be the only state that grants legal personhood to human 
eggs fertilized by means of assisted reproductive technology. Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§  65-6732 (2018) (“The life of each human being begins at fertilization . . . [and] 
unborn children have interests in life, health and well-being that should be 
protected . . . .”). 
 104. LA. STAT. ANN. §  9:123 (2019) (legal capacity of in vitro fertilized human 
ovum as juridical person). 
 105. Id. §  9:124 (“As a juridical person, the in vitro fertilized human ovum 
shall be given an identification by the medical facility for use within the medical 
facility which entitles such ovum to sue or be sued.”). 
 106. Id. §  9:126 (ownership of in vitro fertilized ovum). 
 107. Id. §  9:132. 
 108. Id. §  9:1737. 
 109. Conflicting characterization of human bodily materials as “property” or 
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created by artificial reproductive technology are simultaneously 
“not property” for some purposes and “property” for other 
purposes.110  
This changing nature of human bodily material as not-
property to property (and vice versa) is not unknown in the law, 
but usually relates to when a patient has made a decision to part 
with certain bodily fluid or material for medical research 
purposes.111 Whether embryos are “property” for purposes of 
inheritance and equitable distribution upon divorce are questions 
that different jurisdictions continue to answer inconsistently.112 
But Louisiana appears to be the only state that explicitly labels as 
juridical persons human eggs fertilized through artificial 
reproduction. 113 If those juridical persons can be held in trust, at 
first glance, the trust would seem to violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition against slavery. 114 Yet the entrustment 
of embryos has not been the subject of challenge under Louisiana 
(or any other) law.115  
Granting legal personhood status to embryos created through 
artificial reproductive technology represents a creative legal 
victory by those who believe that life begins at the moment of 
conception.116 These are people who believe that fertilized embryos 
                                                                                                     
“not property” is not unknown in the law. See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Our 
Bodies, Our Tax Selves, 31 VA. TAX REV. 695, 699–717 (2012). 
 110. Supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text. 
 111. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 
(Cal. 1990) (finding that patient had no property interest in his own bodily cells 
used for medical research, but that the scientists who developed products from 
the patient’s cells had a property interest in them). 
 112. See, e.g., Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos But I Get the House 
(and the Business): Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos Upon Divorce, 
57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1177 (2009).  
 113. But see GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-40 (2019) (defining an “embryo” as “an 
individual fertilized ovum of the human species from the single-cell stage to eight-
week development”).  
 114. See, e.g., Emma and Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1, et_al, v. Vergara, 
No. 767-189, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct. Jefferson Par., Dec. 7, 2016) 
(permitting trustee holding two embryos to bring legal action, with no apparent 
objection to legality of trust arrangement).  
 115. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., Susan L. Crockin, The “Embryo” Wars: At the Epicenter of 
Science, Law, Religion, and Politics, 39 FAM. L. Q 599, 610 (explaining that some 
religious groups’ objections to destruction of fertilized eggs). 
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have the same rights as a child, and the rights of those embryos 
are superior to the couple’s right to have the embryos destroyed, 
and, by extension, a pregnant woman’s right to choose to have an 
abortion.117 Many Americans sincerely and deeply hold these 
views; others do not.118  All perspectives deserve fair evaluation, 
taking into account the balancing of rights—and of majoritarian 
and minority interests—that necessarily must occur in a 
democracy.119 
But shifting from a macro-political analysis to a more ground-
eye-view of trusts, consider the ongoing legal dispute between 
television star Sofia Vergara and her former romantic partner Nick 
Loeb.120 When they were engaged to be married, the couple agreed 
to in vitro fertilization that led to the creation of two viable 
embryos in November, 2013.121 The couple decided to freeze the 
embryos.122 After the couple broke up in May, 2014, they could not 
agree about what to do with the embryos, which are stored in a 
medical facility in California.123 The legal agreement they entered 
into prior to the creation of the embryos does not permit either 
party to use the embryos without the other’s consent.124 In fact, the 
agreement provides that if the parties cannot agree about the 
continued “storage, use or disposition” of the embryos, the genetic 
material is deemed to be “abandoned to the medical facility.”125  
                                                                                                     
 117. See, e.g., Robert P. George & Patrick Lee, Embryonic Human Persons: 
Talking Point on Morality and Human Embryo Research, 10 EMBO REP. 301, 303 
(2009) (“embryological evidence shows that the human embryo is a whole, 
although obviously immature, human being; it is not a mere part”) 
 118. See, e.g., Abortion, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion 
.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (showing percentage of Americans who believe 
abortions should be legal in some [50 percent], all [18 percent] or no circumstances 
[29%] has remained relatively constant for the period 1976 to 2018) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 119. See, e.g., JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 153 (1980) (“We are a 
nation of minorities and our system thus depends on the ability and willingness 
of various groups to apprehend those overlapping interests that can bind them 
into a majority on a given issue.”). 
 120. See Petition of Plaintiff, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v. 
Vergara, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct., Dec. 7, 2016) at ¶¶19–55. 
 121. Id. at ¶ 51. 
 122. Id. at ¶ 54. 
 123. Id. at ¶¶ 60–62. 
 124. Id. at ¶ 48. 
 125. Id. at ¶ 49 (citing Form Directive signed by both parties, attached as 
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After the termination of the parties’ romantic relationship, 
Loeb sought Vergara’s permission to have the embryos implanted 
into a gestational surrogate, but Vergara did not consent.126 Loeb 
then brought suit in Los Angeles, California against both Vergara 
and the medical facility, asserting his parental rights over the 
embryos.127 He dropped that lawsuit on December 6, 2016, after 
Vergara’s counsel sought in discovery the names of two former 
romantic partners of Loeb who had undergone abortions.128 
On December 7, 2016—the day after the California case was 
dismissed—Loeb filed a petition in the District Court of Louisiana, 
24th Judicial District, Jefferson Parish.129 Some time during the 
California proceedings, Loeb had established sufficient contacts 
with the jurisdiction of Louisiana to be able to avail himself of the 
state law that grants legal personhood status to embryos created 
through artificial reproductive technology.130 He created a trust 
under Louisiana law on November 30, 2016, and on December 5, 
2016, he modified the trust to benefit the embryos, if one or both 
developed into a live baby, and gave the embryos the names 
“Emma” and “Isabella.”131  
The plaintiffs in Loeb’s Louisiana case are denominated as 
“Human Embryo # 4 HB-A (‘Emma’),” “Human Embryo #3 HB-A 
(‘Isabella’)” and the “Trustee of the Emma and Isabella Trust No. 
1.”132 According to its terms, the trust becomes irrevocable if and 
when either or both embryos develop into fetuses and are born 
                                                                                                     
Exhibit A to Petition). 
 126. Id. at ¶ 62. 
 127.  Id. at ¶ 67. See also Complaint, Loeb v. Vergara and ART Reproductive 
Center, Inc. (Super. Ct. Cal. L.A. Co. 2014). 
 128. See Petition of Plaintiff, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v. 
Vergara, No. 767-189, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct., Dec. 7, 2016) at ¶ 68. 
 129. See id. at ¶¶19–55. 
 130. See, e.g., Transcript, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v. 
Vergara, No. 767-189, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct., Dec. 7, 2016) at 17 (in 
response to question of whether Loeb created the trust immediately prior to filing 
suit in Louisiana, counsel responded that “Mr. Loeb himself has sufficient 
contacts and reason why he's bringing the—why he created the trust here in 
Louisiana. There's plenty of information that shows that.”). A federal District 
Court later found that Loeb is a citizen of Florida. Order and Reasons, Emma & 
Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v. Vergara, ECF 2:17-cv-01498 at 2. 
 131. See Order and Reasons, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v. 
Vergara, No. 767-189, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct., Dec. 7, 2016) at 5. 
 132. Id. 
LESS TRUST MEANS MORE TRUST 95 
alive.133 At that time, they will become the sole discretionary 
beneficiaries of the trust.134 Loeb’s petition states that the embryos 
have the expectation of an inheritance from Vergara, and 
Vergara’s refusal to allow the embryos to develop into fetuses (and 
then be born) effectively denies them their inheritance.135 
The case was removed from the 24th Judicial District, 
Jefferson Parish, upon petition by Vergara,136 and the case was 
assigned to the federal District Court. There, Vergara successfully 
argued for dismissal of the case on the grounds that she is not 
subject to general or specific jurisdiction in Louisiana.137  
In January 2018, Loeb brought another suit against Vergara 
in Louisiana.138 The case was transferred to federal District Court 
where Loeb then sued for custody of the embryos under the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and 
motioned for removal of the case back to state court.139 Vergara 
motioned to dismiss the case, arguing that such law does not apply 
to the embryos and, even if it did, she is not subject to jurisdiction 
in Louisiana.140  
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. at ¶¶ 75–76 
 134. Id. at ¶ 77. It is not clear whether there are other current beneficiaries 
of the trust, whether the trust is revocable or irrevocable, and how Loeb could 
transfer the embryos to the trust when the embryos remain in medical storage in 
California. Also, if neither Loeb nor Vergara is permitted by the terms of the 
agreement to use the embryos without the other’s consent, supra note 124, then 
Loeb’s transfer of the embryos to the trust would violate the agreement. 
 135. Id. at ¶¶163–177 (alleging that Vergara is “required to provide for [the 
embryos’] care and administration, that the trust was created “for the express 
purpose of benefitting Emma and Isabella and providing for their health, 
education, maintenance and support” and that Vergara’s refusal to allow the 
embryos to be implanted in a surrogate “caused and continues to cause [the 
embryos] financial harm”). 
 136. Notice of Removal, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v. 
Vergara (La. Dist. Ct., Feb. 21, 2017). 
 137.  Order and Reasons, Emma & Isabella Louisiana Trust No. 1 et al. v. 
Vergara, No. 767-189, 2016 WL 7239128 (La. Dist. Ct., Dec. 7, 2016) at 1, 10–12. 
 138. Loeb, Human Embryo #3 HB-A, and Human Embryo #4 HB-A v. 
Vergara, 25th Jud. Dist. Parish of Paquimines No. 64-217A. 
 139.  First Amended Complaint for Sole Child Custody, Loeb et al. v. Vergara, 
Case 2:18CV03165 (D. La. Apr. 17, 2018) and Order and Reasons, 2:18CV03165 
(D. La. May 18, 2018) (grant of motion to remand to 25th Judicial District Court, 
Parish of Plaquemines, State of Louisiana). 
 140. Loeb et al. v. Vergara, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State 
a Claim, 2:18CV03165 (D. La. May 1, 2018). 
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Loeb opposed Vergara’s motion to dismiss in a way that 
curiously—although obliquely—raises the issue this Essay 
identifies: There is a contradiction between treating the embryos 
both as “persons,” in the sense of allowing them to sue, and as 
“property,” by allowing them to be held in the very trust Loeb 
created.141 Specifically, Loeb urges the court to recognize that 
Louisiana law accords to fertilized eggs the same status as human 
beings, even though other states do not, and that this split in state 
law harkens back to pre-Civil War treatment of African Americans 
as slaves by some states and not by others. He compares the case 
of the entrusted embryos to the case of Solomon Northup, the free 
man from New York sold into slavery in Louisiana in 1841 whose 
memoir was the basis for the film 12 Years a Slave:142 
There was a question at the time as to whether New York had 
the jurisdiction to reach into Louisiana and retrieve Northup 
but the New York governor discussed it with Louisiana officials 
and they were allowed to retrieve him . . . . [L]egislation in most 
states on this issue [means] state courts are left to decide if 
embryos are human beings or property or something in 
between. 
Loeb’s analogy of embryos to slaves is problematic, historically 
flawed, and entirely confusing.143 His comparison of the embryos 
to Simon Northup is equally puzzling, given it is Loeb himself that 
created the trust for (or for the benefit of) the embryos.144 The 
District Court has remanded the case to the state court.145 
                                                                                                     
 141. See supra notes 103–115 and accompanying text. 
 142. 12 YEARS A SLAVE (Regency Enterprises et al. 2013). See also The 
Kidnapping Case: Narrative of the Seizure and Recovery of Solomon Northup, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
20,1853),https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1853/01/20/751239 
62.pdf. 
 143. See, e.g., Orville Vernon Burton, The Creation and Destruction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment During the Long Civil War, 79 LA. L. REV. 189, 216–34 
(2018) (describing significant judicial reluctance to recognizing and enforcing 
rights of former slaves during post-war era).  
 144. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 145. Order and Reasons, Loeb et al. v. Vergara, Case 2:18CV03165 (D. La. 
May 18, 2018) (granting Loeb’s motion to remand to state court). In the meantime, 
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v. Loeb, Super. Ct. BC650580. On appeal of the lower court’s denial of Loeb’s 
motion to strike, Vergara’s malicious prosecution claim has been dismissed, but 
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Trusts for embryos are not unique to Louisiana. One 
Mississippi lawyer markets to clients a “Fertility Preservation 
Trust,” at a cost of $850, to provide “a detailed plan for your 
embryos now and well into the future.”146 If such a “fertility trust” 
and the trust created by Loeb in Louisiana are traditional private 
express trusts, then there persists the inherent contradiction 
between Louisiana’s view that embryos are legal “persons” and 
allowing persons to be held in trust.147 It is possible that the word 
“trust” in the context of embryos is being used euphemistically, 
with the “trust” being a legal equivalent of a guardianship 
arrangement, and the trustee is performing the functions that a 
guardian ad litem would in other jurisdictions.148 Even so, consider 
the significance of injecting a trust into legal disputes over genetic 
material created via assisted reproductive technology when 
Louisiana law buttresses those disputes by recognizing a fertilized 
egg as a legal person.149  
Trusts for embryos obscure debates about the legal rights, if 
any, that should attach from the moment of conception, how those 
rights conflict with the decision to become a parent or not, and 
what limits there are to a woman’s right to decide what happens 
with her own body.150 Trusts obscure and make inaccessible what 
should be serious discussions about reproductive rights. Trust talk 
pushes those legal, political, ethical, moral, and even religious 
conversations further away from venues and language that are 
accessible to most people.151 Trusts for embryos are far more 
                                                                                                     
her breach of contract claim may go forward.  Vergara v. Loeb, 2019  WL 337817 
(Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Co., Jan. 28, 2019) (unpublished/noncitable opinion).  
 146. See Ashley W. Pittman, Fertility Preservation Trust, 
https://trustfertility.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (on file with the Wasington 
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 147. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, e.g., John Crouch, The Child’s Attorney, 26 FAM. ADVOC. 31 (2004) 
(describing the difference between guardians ad litem and attorneys for children). 
 149. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 150. See, e.g., Jonathan F. Will, Beyond Abortion: Why the Personhood 
Movement Implicates Reproductive Choice, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 573 (2013) 
(exploring multiple implications of embryo personhood language for pregnant 
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 151. Cf. Judith F. Daar, Direct Democracy and Bioethical Choices: Voting Life 
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insidious and harmful to the U.S. political and legal systems—far 
more termite-like—than any loss of revenue from perpetual 
trusts.152  
VI. Conclusion 
Once one identifies the fault lines in a political system, the 
next question is what individuals and communities can do to repair 
them. To the extent that trusts of property have anti-democratic 
effects, there is an argument to minimize or discourage their use 
for wealth transfer purposes or to make them entirely unavailable 
except in cases of minor or disabled beneficiaries.153 Certainly, the 
Louisiana law that permits trusts for embryos shows what lengths 
that opposing sides will go when they can no longer have civil 
conversations with each other to achieve legal compromises 
acceptable to most people. Trusts should not be deployed as 
weapons in the culture wars. 
Lawyers need to be attuned to both trust and trusts in society.  
Measuring and monitoring both reveal what most needs repairing 
in the foundation of society. If a community, group or system has 
been damaged through multiple termite bites, the time is ripe to 
deploy multiple clusters of metaphorical spiders to restore it. 
Consider, for example, that approximately one-half of all spiders 
build webs for the purpose of catching prey.154 But spider webs also 
play a role in maintaining social communities155 and providing 
physical security to the aphids.156 Through individual and 
                                                                                                     
and Death at the Ballot Box, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 800 (1995) (discussing 
direct democracy on important questions linked to religion or ethics). 
 152. See supra Part IV.A. 
 153. See supra notes 65–83 and accompanying text.  
 154. See, e.g., Jonas O. Wolff et al., The Great Silk Alternative: Multiple Co-
evolution of Web Loss and Sticky Hairs in Spiders n. 9, PLOS ONE (last updated 
May 1, 2013) (last visited Apr. 1, 2019), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ 
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 155. See, e.g., Ingi Agnarsson, Spider Webs as Habitat Patches: The 
Distribution of Kelptoparasites (Argyrodes, Theridiiidae) Among Host Webs 
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 156. See, e.g., Bengt Gunnarsson, Bird Predation on Spiders: Ecological 
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collective interactions, communications and efforts to build webs 
to connect to each other, it is possible to create presumptions of 
wisdom, goodwill and ethics. In terms of tensile strength, a spider’s 
web is stronger than a steel cable.157 Political and legal structures 
in the U.S., like a spider web, are both fragile but strong. Termites 
destroy structures.158 Spiders create new and better places to 
dwell.159 Democracy, trust and trusts need spiders, not termites.  
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